jacques-henri.jourdan [at] lri [dot] fr
Rust is a new systems programming language that promises to overcome the seemingly fundamental tradeoff between high-level safety guarantees and low-level control over resource management. Unfortunately, none of Rust's safety claims have been formally proven, and there is good reason to question whether they actually hold. Specifically, Rust employs a strong, ownership-based type system, but then extends the expressive power of this core type system through libraries that internally use unsafe features. In this paper, we give the first formal (and machine-checked) safety proof for a language representing a realistic subset of Rust. Our proof is extensible in the sense that, for each new Rust library that uses unsafe features, we can say what verification condition it must satisfy in order for it to be deemed a safe extension to the language. We have carried out this verification for some of the most important libraries that are used throughout the Rust ecosystem.
The syntax of the C programming language is described in the C11 standard by an ambiguous context-free grammar, accompanied with English prose that describes the concept of “scope” and indicates how certain ambiguous code fragments should be interpreted. Based on these elements, the problem of implementing a compliant C11 parser is not entirely trivial. We review the main sources of difficulty and describe a relatively simple solution to the problem. Our solution employs the well-known technique of combining an LALR(1) parser with a “lexical feedback” mechanism. It draws on folklore knowledge and adds several original aspects, including: a twist on lexical feedback that allows a smooth interaction with lookahead; a simplified and powerful treatment of scopes; and a few amendments in the grammar. Although not formally verified, our parser avoids several pitfalls that other implementations have fallen prey to. We believe that its simplicity, its mostly-declarative nature, and its high similarity with the C11 grammar are strong informal arguments in favor of its correctness. Our parser is accompanied with a small suite of “tricky” C11 programs. We hope that it may serve as a reference or a starting point in the implementation of compilers and analysis tools.
Concurrent separation logics (CSLs) have come of age, and with age they have accumulated a great deal of complexity Previous work on the Iris logic attempted to reduce the complex logical mechanisms of modern CSLs to two orthogonal concepts: partial commutative monoids (PCMs) and invariants. However, the realization of these concepts in Iris still bakes in several complex mechanisms–such as weakest preconditions and mask-changing view shifts–as primitive notions.
In this paper, we take the Iris story to its (so to speak) logical conclusion, applying the reductionist methodology of Iris to Iris itself. Specifically, we define a small, resourceful base logic, which distills the essence of Iris: it comprises only the assertion layer of vanilla separation logic, plus a handful of simple modalities. We then show how the much fancier logical mechanisms of Iris–in particular, its entire program specification layer–can be understood as merely derived forms in our base logic. This approach helps to explain the meaning of Iris’s program specifications at a much higher level of abstraction than was previously possible. We also show that the step-indexed "later" modality of Iris is an essential source of complexity, in that removing it leads to a logical inconsistency. All our results are fully formalized in the Coq proof assistant.
Known algorithms for manipulating octagons do not preserve their sparsity, leading typically to quadratic or cubic time and space complexities even if no relation among variables is known when they are all bounded. In this paper, we present new algorithms, which use and return octagons represented as weakly closed difference bound matrices, preserve the sparsity of their input and have better performance in the case their inputs are sparse. We prove that these algorithms are as precise as the known ones.
In order to develop safer software for critical applications, some static analyzers aim at establishing, with mathematical certitude, the absence of some classes of bug in the input program. A possible limit to this approach is the possibility of a soundness bug in the static analyzer itself, which would nullify the guarantees it is supposed to deliver.
In this thesis, we propose to establish formal guarantees on the static analyzer itself: we present the design, implementation and proof of soundness using Coq of Verasco, a formally verified static analyzer based on abstract interpretation handling most of the ISO C99 language, including IEEE754 floating-point arithmetic (except recursion and dynamic memory allocation). Verasco aims at establishing the absence of erroneous behavior of the given programs. It enjoys a modular extendable architecture with several abstract domains and well-specified interfaces. We present the abstract iterator of Verasco, its handling of bounded machine arithmetic, its interval abstract domain, its symbolic abstract domain and its abstract domain of octagons. Verasco led to the development of new techniques for implementing data structure with sharing in Coq.
Floating-point arithmetic is known to be tricky: roundings, formats, exceptional values. The IEEE-754 standard was a push towards straightening the field and made formal reasoning about floating-point computations easier and flourishing. Unfortunately, this is not sufficient to guarantee the final result of a program, as several other actors are involved: programming language, compiler, and architecture. The CompCert formally-verified compiler provides a solution to this problem: this compiler comes with a mathematical specification of the semantics of its source language (a large subset of ISO C99) and target platforms (ARM, PowerPC, x86-SSE2), and with a proof that compilation preserves semantics. In this paper, we report on our recent success in formally specifying and proving correct CompCert’s compilation of floating-point arithmetic. Since CompCert is verified using the Coq proof assistant, this effort required a suitable Coq formalization of the IEEE-754 standard; we extended the Flocq library for this purpose. As a result, we obtain the first formally verified compiler that provably preserves the semantics of floating-point programs.
This paper reports on the design and soundness proof, using the Coq proof assistant, of Verasco, a static analyzer based on abstract interpretation for most of the ISO C 1999 language (excluding recursion and dynamic allocation). Verasco establishes the absence of run-time errors in the analyzed programs. It enjoys a modular architecture that supports the extensible combination of multiple abstract domains, both relational and non-relational. Verasco integrates with the CompCert formally-verified C compiler so that not only the soundness of the analysis results is guaranteed with mathematical certitude, but also the fact that these guarantees carry over to the compiled code.
We report on four different approaches to implementing hash-consing in Coq programs. The use cases include execution inside Coq, or execution of the extracted OCaml code. We explore the different trade-offs between faithful use of pristine extracted code, and code that is fine-tuned to make use of OCaml programming constructs not available in Coq. We discuss the possible consequences in terms of performances and guarantees. We use the running example of binary decision diagrams and then demonstrate the generality of our solutions by applying them to other examples of hash-consed data structures.
In this paper, we focus on finding positive invariants and Lyapunov functions to establish reachability and stability properties, respectively, of polynomial ordinary differential equations (ODEs). In general, the search for such functions is a hard problem. As a result, numerous techniques have been developed to search for polynomial differential variants that yield positive invariants and polynomial Lyapunov functions that prove stability, for systems defined by polynomial differential equations. However, the systematic search for non-polynomial functions is considered a much harder problem, and has received much less attention. In this paper, we combine ideas from computer algebra with the Sum-Of-Squares (SOS) relaxation for polynomial positive semi-definiteness to find non polynomial differential variants and Lyapunov functions for polynomial ODEs. Using the well-known concept of Darboux polynomials, we show how Darboux polynomials can, in many instances, naturally lead to specific forms of Lyapunov functions that involve rational function, logarithmic and exponential terms.We demonstrate the value of our approach by deriving non-polynomial Lyapunov functions for numerical examples drawn from the literature.
We report on three different approaches to use hash-consing in programs certified with the Coq system, using binary decision diagrams (BDD) as running example. The use cases include execution inside Coq, or execution of the extracted OCaml code. There are different trade-offs between faithful use of pristine extracted code, and code that is fine-tuned to make use of OCaml programming constructs not available in Coq. We discuss the possible consequences in terms of performances and guarantees.
Floating-point arithmetic is known to be tricky: roundings, formats, exceptional values. The IEEE-754 standard was a push towards straightening the field and made formal reasoning about floating-point computations easier and flourishing. Unfortunately, this is not sufficient to guarantee the final result of a program, as several other actors are involved: programming language, compiler, architecture. The Comp Certformally-verified compiler provides a solution to this problem: this compiler comes with a mathematical specification of the semantics of its source language (a large subset of ISO C90) and target platforms (ARM, PowerPC, x86-SSE2), and with a proof that compilation preserves semantics. In this paper, we report on our recent success in formally specifying and proving correct Comp Cert's compilation of floating-point arithmetic. Since CompCert is verified using the Coq proof assistant, this effort required a suitable Coq formalization of the IEEE-754 standard, we extended the Flocq library for this purpose. As a result, we obtain the first formally verified compiler that provably preserves the semantics of floating-point programs.
3D integration is a promising advanced manufacturing process offering a variety of new hardware security protection opportunities. This paper presents a way of securing 3D ICs using Hamiltonian paths as hardware integrity verification sensors. As 3D integration consists in the stacking of many metal layers, one can consider surrounding a security-sensitive circuit part by a wire cage.
After exploring and comparing different cage construction strategies (and reporting preliminary implementation results on silicon), we introduce a "hardware canary". The canary is a spatially distributed chain of functions F i positioned at the vertices of a 3D cage surrounding a protected circuit. A correct answer (F n ∘ … ∘ F 1)(m) to a challenge m attests the canary's integrity.
An LR(1) parser is a finite-state automaton, equipped with a stack, which uses a combination of its current state and one lookahead symbol in order to determine which action to perform next. We present a validator which, when applied to a context-free grammar G and an automaton A, checks that A and G agree. Validating the parser provides the correctness guarantees required by verified compilers and other high-assurance software that involves parsing. The validation process is independent of which technique was used to construct A. The validator is implemented and proved correct using the Coq proof assistant. As an application, we build a formally-verified parser for the C99 language.
This file was generated by bibtex2html 1.98.